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WiM MaTTHys
Observe All: On the Staging of Fundamental 
Fantasy, Jouissance, and Gaze in Stanley 
Kubrick’s A Clockwork Orange
in his 2007 book The Real Gaze: Film Theory after Lacan, 
Todd McGowan devotes a chapter to the cinematography of 
the american director stanley Kubrick (1928–1999). as the 
title of his book suggests, the author focuses on French psy-
choanalyst Jacques Lacan’s concept of the gaze or the blind 
spot in the visual field that marks the subjective implication 
of the spectator in the act of seeing (Lacan, 1963–64/1994). 
For McGowan the central quality of Kubrick’s films is that they 
respond to the way spectators, in their everyday perception of 
social reality, tend unconsciously to blind themselves to the 
obscene underside that marks the functioning of symbolic au-
thority. according to the author: “We obey symbolic authorities 
because we don’t see this underside, because they seem to be 
acting in the interest of the public good rather than for their 
own private enjoyment” (2007, p. 45). This recalls the neu-
rotic split in the perception of authority—originally described 
by Freud in Totem and Taboo (1913 [1912–13])—between the 
instance of the idealized (dead) father as “guarantor of the 
‘neutral’ stature of the symbolic Law” and his complement, 
the obscene father who is the “master of enjoyment” (Žižek, 
1992/2008, pp. 178–179). as McGowan points out, Kubrick’s 
oeuvre explicitly marks the obscene dimension of authority 
by staging its legal representatives as excessively enjoying their 
position: “Whenever a character takes up a position of authority 
in one of Kubrick’s films, he . . . inevitably finds an obscene 
enjoyment in this role” (2007, p. 47).
McGowan distinguishes two cinematic techniques used by 
Kubrick to highlight this surplus of enjoyment: his deployment 
of scenery and the performances he elicits from his actors. The 
first concerns the ‘settings’ in which the cinematographic action 
226 Observe all
takes place, for example the excessive luxury of the chateau 
that serves Paths of Glory’s (1957) General Mireau as a personal 
base of operations far behind the trenches of the First World 
War. Kubrick’s deployment of that setting highlights specifi-
cally how the General “[d]erives a surplus enjoyment from his 
symbolic position of power” (p. 48). as examples of the second 
technique, McGowan refers to the over-the-top performances 
that Kubrick derived from actors in their impersonations of 
authority figures, including: George C. scott’s power-hungry 
General Turgidson in Dr. Strangelove (1964); Jack Nicholson’s 
Jack Torrance, the derailed father figure in The Shining (1980); 
Lee Ermey’s Gunnery sergeant Hartman, the drill instructor 
in Full Metal Jacket (1987), who incessantly employs humiliation 
to mold his recruits; and. finally, Michael Bates’ chief prison 
guard in A Clockwork Orange (1971). Bates’ guard exaggeratedly 
screams at and humiliates the juvenile delinquent alex upon 
the latter’s entrance into jail. A Clockwork Orange, Kubrick’s 
adaptation of anthony Burgess’ 1962 novel of the same name 
and his ninth feature film, provides the focus of this essay.
as a nuance to McGowan’s thesis, this essay argues that 
not only figures of authority resort to methods of transgression 
in A Clockwork Orange. in fact, the film stages their acts of sup-
pression as responses to the equally violent acts of transgression 
committed by the story’s hoodlum. aggression thus appears 
within every layer of society represented in the film, making 
A Clockwork Orange not only the apex of the “Golden age of 
american film violence” in the 1960s and 1970s, but also a mir-
ror of america’s contemporary sociopolitical concerns (slocum, 
2001; strange, 2010). as Prince (1998) points out, Kubrick’s 
homeland at the time faced “steep increases in homicide, rape, 
aggravated assault, and robbery,” which “fed a sharp public 
fear of street crime and nourished the law-and-order platform 
of Richard Nixon during the 1968 and 1972 presidential cam-
paigns” (p. 28). stanley Kubrick commented upon the spread-
ing atmosphere of insecurity in the United states, specifically 
with regard to New york, his city of birth. in a 1972 interview 
with Gene siskel, the director expressed his concern that in 
response to violence public opinion might lean towards “more 
authority of a much tougher kind” (siskel, 1972/2001, p. 119). 
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as an american Jew with Polish Galician roots, the director’s 
preoccupation with the issue of derailed authorities was likely 
influenced by the Nazi atrocities that scourged Europe while 
he was in his teens (Cocks, 2004). A Clockwork Orange in sev-
eral instances—for example the inclusion of a sequence from 
Riefenstahl’s Third Reich-propaganda film Triumph Des Willens 
(1935)—makes explicit reference to Nazism. 
The critical responses to A Clockwork Orange in the 1970s 
predominantly revolved around the film’s representation of 
violence (staiger, 2000). One response, reflecting the ongoing 
law-and-order debate, accused the film of staging gratuitous 
violence and thus of desensitizing its viewers; the movie even 
received mention in the proposal to revise the U.s. obscenity 
law to include not only representations of sexuality but also 
cinematographic depictions of violence. Public claims that the 
film inspired incidences of real-life criminality intensified the 
controversy, specifically in the U.K., where the director lived 
from 1969 (Baxter, 1997). Under the pressure of ongoing 
criticism and death threats, the director in 1974 convinced 
Warner Bros. to withdraw A Clockwork Orange from distribution 
in England, a self-imposed ban that remained in effect until 
the film’s re-release in Britain on March 17, 2000 (Ciment, 
2008). Closely connected to the controversy over the film’s 
depictions of violence, a second stream of criticism centered 
on its supposed ideological messages (staiger, 2000). For ex-
ample, in The New York Times, the newspaper’s education editor, 
Fred M. Hechinger, accused the film of promoting fascism. 
The director proclaimed that, to the contrary, his film had to 
be interpreted as an anti-authoritarian text (Hechinger, 1972, 
February 13; Kubrick, 1972, February 27). another ideological 
critique, which reflected the rise of 1970s feminist film criticism, 
interpreted A Clockwork Orange’s intertwining of violence and 
sexuality as representing a misogynist, gender-related political 
agenda (staiger, 2000; Walker, 1972).
This essay marks how the scenario of a fundamental fantasy 
structures the film’s staging of violence, authority, and sexual-
ity. although McGowan’s analysis of A Clockwork Orange refers 
to the concept of a fundamental fantasy, it does not propose 
what specific scenario structures the narrative of A Clockwork Or-
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ange. This essay argues, in the first place, that the film derives 
its structure from the basic scenario “c observes: a overpow-
ers b,” adding the dimension of an observer (C) to the posi-
tions of perpetrator (a) and victim (B) in the beating fantasy 
originally described by Freud (1919). second, as a nuance to 
McGowan’s thesis that Kubrick’s film marks the jouissance/
obscene enjoyment of symbolic authority, it highlights how A 
Clockwork Orange’s references to jouissance are associated with 
the three positions of that scenario. Third, the essay argues 
that the staging of the fundamental fantasy extends beyond the 
level of the film’s narrative, as it marks the positions of both 
Kubrick and the spectator in the cinematographic experience. 
Whereas McGowan (p. 25) claims that, in the end, Kubrick’s 
films tend to leave the spectator “unscathed,” our interpreta-
tion of the ultimate effect of A Clockwork Orange implies a break 
in the spectator’s position of distant voyeur. Finally, and as an 
indication of the broader relevance of Lacan’s concept of the 
fundamental fantasy in his approach to subjectivity, the essay 
points to a remarkable parallel between the implications of the 
making of Kubrick’s feature film and the staging of social psy-
chologist Philip Zimbardo’s 1971 stanford Prison Experiment.
Toward the Scenario of a Fundamental Fantasy
Lacan’s theory of the fundamental fantasy must be distin-
guished from the concept of fantasy, which can, for example, 
refer to the phenomena of the daydream.1 as Verhaeghe (1997) 
points out, the fundamental fantasy is to be interpreted as a 
“generating structure,” which is “at the base of all symptoms 
including the daydream” (p. 259). For Verhaeghe (2008), the 
fundamental fantasy can best be understood as a basic “cogni-
tive-affective script through which we approach the world” (p. 
142). as such, a crucial function of the fundamental fantasy 
is to provide the coordinates by which a subject interprets his 
own position and that of others towards an inherently am-
biguous social reality. With regard to the fundamental fantasy, 
Žižek (2008) refers to Lacan’s remark that the question which 
grounds subjectivity is not “What do i want?” but “What am i to 
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others?” (p. 9). in other words, what puzzles the subject at the 
level of the unconscious is not ‘who’ he or she is as a subject, 
but what object he or she is in the desire of the Other (Lacan, 
1966/2002; Žižek, 2008).2 Thereby Lacan accentuates the role 
of the Other in his reformulation of Freud’s (1905) thesis on 
the incestuous origin and repetitive character of human desire: 
“The finding of an object is in fact a refinding of it” (p. 222). 
as a total identification with the object of the Other’s desire 
is structurally impossible, the fundamental fantasy ultimately 
takes on the form of a basic scenario that stages the imaginary 
fulfillment of that state of symbiosis and as such delineates the 
coordinates for the subject’s desire (Lacan, 1963–64/1994; 
Neill, 2011).
as a paradigmatic example of a fundamental fantasy, Lacan 
in several instances throughout his seminars refers to the fan-
tasy of fustigation that Freud described in his 1919 article A 
Child is Being Beaten (Pluth, 2007).3 in his interpretation, Lacan 
(1966–67, lesson of January 11, 1967) emphasizes that Freud 
presented the beating fantasy as structured by a basic scenario, 
a ‘grammatical sentence,’ of which the exact form varied in 
accordance with its chronologically phased development. in 
Freud’s female patients, the scenario varied over three chrono-
logical stages: “Father beats the child (whom i hate)” (phase 
1), “i am being beaten by my father” (phase 2) and “a child 
is being beaten (by a representative of the father)” (phase 3) 
(Freud, 1919, p. 185). in Lacan’s (1956–57/1994) interpreta-
tion the second of these stages is essential, as it marks the 
object-like position to which the subject producing the fantasy 
is attracted unconsciously. as Žižek (2008) points out, it is a 
“[k]ind of ‘Thou art that!’ which articulates the very kernel 
of the subject’s being” (pp. 48–49).4 With regard to his male 
patients (two out of six cases), Freud detected only two stages 
in the constitution of the fantasy: “i am being beaten by my 
father” and “i am being beaten by my mother” (1919, p. 198). 
The parties who adopted the positions of aggressor and victim 
varied according to the phase of the fantasy and the sex of the 
patient. specifically with regard to the conclusive form of the 
female version of the fantasy, Freud adds that the act of beat-
ing itself could be replaced by “punishments and humiliations 
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of another kind” (p. 186). Therefore we formally write down 
the scenario of the fantasy as “a overpowers b,” in which the 
two variables ‘a’ and ‘b’ accord with the positions of aggressor 
(a) and victim (B).
Remarkably, the scenario “a overpowers b” presented by 
Freud’s patients is staged in numerous instances in the narra-
tive of A Clockwork Orange. in the film’s first part, the central 
character alex takes up the position of the perpetrator (a). 
accompanied by his gang, he sequentially overpowers a beg-
gar (scene 3), a rival gang (scene 4) and a writer and his wife 
(scene 6).5 subsequently alex turns against his fellow gangsters 
by psychologically dominating and hitting one of them with 
a cane (scene 6) and later kicking two others into a canal 
(scene 12) (Fig. 1). Finally, he assaults and murders the female 
caretaker of a health farm, for which he is arrested (scene 14). 
From that point on, alex gradually starts to switch from the 
position (a) of the aggressor to the position (B) of the victim 
of violence. This shift is initially, but not exclusively, marked by 
his encounter with the film’s representatives of authority. The 
police (scene 15) and the chief prison guard (scenes 16–19) 
brutalize alex. His participation in a social rehabilitation 
program, “The Ludovico Technique,” gets him out of jail but 
also exposes him to the methods of torture deployed by the 
film’s representatives of scientific authority (Roudinesco, 2009; 
strange, 2010). The ‘treatment’ displays its effects in the scene 
where alex proves incapable of defending against two actors 
who publicly violate him on a theatre stage (scene 23) (Fig. 2). 
in the following sequence, alex’s former victims one by one 
take their revenge on him: in turn, the beggar (scene 28), his 
former companions (scene 29) and the writer (scenes 30–31) 
overpower him. Thus, a pattern of passive-active reversal can 
be discerned in the construction of the film’s violence: whereas 
alex shifts from position (a) of the perpetrator to position (B) 
of the victim, his opponents do the opposite.
With regard to the conclusive form of the beating fantasy, 
Freud (1919) remarked with some surprise that it did not stage 
a representation of the patients themselves. He insistently asked 
them about their own position with regard to the fantasy, which 
typically resulted in the brief declaration: “i am probably look-
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Figure 1. alex kicks a fellow gangster into a canal (scene 12).  
stanley Kubrick, A Clockwork Orange, Hawk Films/Warner Bros.
Figure 2. an actor physically assaults and humiliates alex (scene 23).  
stanley Kubrick, A Clockwork Orange, Hawk Films/Warner Bros.
ing on” (p. 186). Lacan (1966–67, lesson of June 21, 1967) 
also refers to the subject’s identification with the ‘look’ that 
hovers over the scene of fustigation.6 although neither Freud 
nor Lacan comment further on the role of the spectator, it is 
essential to take that third position into account to complete 
the scenario of the fundamental fantasy that structures the 
narrative of A Clockwork Orange.
in fact, in several instances, the film explicitly stages the 
act of observation. The most obvious example concerns the 
depiction of the Ludovico technique, which is deployed for 
alex’s ‘rehabilitation’ (scenes 21–22) (Fig. 3). During the treat-
ment, alex is strapped to a wheelchair in a cinema auditorium, 
while his eyelids are artificially propped open. Placed in front 
of the film screen and forced to view projected sequences of 
violence, or “a overpowers b,” alex now is compelled to take 
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the position (C) of the observer (scenes 21–22). staged in a 
film theatre, the Ludovico technique directly reminds us of 
two sequences in the film that enact violence for a public of 
observers. a first example, depicted early in the film, portrays 
members of the rival gang assaulting a young woman on the 
stage of a deserted opera house. Crucially, a reverse angle shot 
suddenly reveals the presence of alex and his gang as specta-
tors in the back of the theatre (scene 4). The second example 
concerns the sequence in which the effects of the Ludovico 
technique are demonstrated, that is, when alex is humiliated 
on a theatre stage for an audience of theatre-goers (scene 23). 
Here the film’s ‘minister of the interior’ explicitly invites his 
theatre audience to focus on alex’s torture—“Observe all!” he 
declares—extending the scenario of the fundamental fantasy 
that structures the film’s narrative to its completed form: “c 
observes: a overpowers b.”
Burgess (1962/1986) explains that he originally associ-
ated the title, A Clockwork Orange, with the condition whereby 
a subject is reduced to no more than a “clockwork toy” (p. 
xiii) or puppet in the hands of a higher order power, as for 
example the state. in light of Lacan’s theory, we can see that 
all three positions in the scenario “c observes: a overpowers 
b” reflect objectified or puppet-like positions that the subject 
might unconsciously be impelled to adopt toward the Other. 
in fact, throughout the film, alex shifts across the three posi-
tions described in the formula of the fundamental fantasy: he 
overpowers (a), is victimized (B), or observes (C). indeed, 
Figure 3. The Ludovico technique is staged in a cinema auditorium (scene 21). 
stanley Kubrick, A Clockwork Orange, Hawk Films/Warner Bros.
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the majority of the other characters do the same and can be 
regarded as mere copies of the film’s anti-hero,7 the clearest 
illustration of which can be found in the figure of the leftist 
writer in the HOME-sequence, who is unambiguously called 
Mr. Alexander (Daniels, 1973).
Kubrick’s depiction of the beating fantasy draws attention 
to the interrelation and complicity between the positions staged 
in the fundamental fantasy. alex’s submission to the Ludovico 
technique implies that he, by being forced to observe violence, 
is simultaneously a victim of torture, illustrating the interrela-
tion between the positions of victim (B) and observer (C). The 
same interrelation appears in the position of the writer during 
the HOME-sequence, when alex’s gang forces him to observe 
the violation of his wife (scene 6). The film’s depiction of the 
Ludovico technique also alludes to the complicity between per-
petrator (a) and observer (C). During alex’s ‘rehabilitation,’ 
the higher-order perpetrator in charge of the experiment, 
Dr. Brodsky, is staged as a distant observer in the back of the 
auditorium, while the role of executioner is delegated to an 
assistant (see Fig. 3). Upon alex’s arrival in jail, the chief prison 
guard appears as the delinquent’s personal tormentor, but he 
reappears as part of the observing public during alex’s on-stage 
humiliation (scenes 16 & 23). Finally, the interrelation of the 
positions in the fundamental fantasy also has a counterpart 
in the film’s depiction of a mutual exchangeability of gender 
positions, intertwined with a disavowal of sexual difference. Not 
only is the gender of alex’s victims variable, but so too that of 
his aggressors. in the application of the Ludovico technique, for 
example, Dr. Branom, the female assistant of the experiment 
leader continuously belittles alex and it is she who wields the 
syringe, an instance of the phallic instrument that deploys an 
enfeebling serum into alex’s body (scenes 20–21).
significantly, both Freud (1919) and Lacan (1957–
58/1998) link the staged development of the beating fantasy 
with a subject’s working-through of the Oedipus complex. 
Two early scenes of Kubrick’s film deliberately allude to that 
link. The first depicts alex’s assault on the writer and his wife 
(scene 6). Just as the nameplate in front of the writer’s house 
suggestively depicts it as ‘HOME,’ so its owners, according to 
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their age, could have been alex’s parents. as Pauline Kael 
(1972/2003) points out, by his subsequent acts of sadism, the 
hoodlum thus “[c]ommits symbolic incest . . . and indirectly, 
patricide” (p. 45). The second explicit reference to the Oedi-
pal theme appears in the scene where alex murders the older 
woman who owns the health farm (scene 14). Here alex deploys 
the giant sculpture of a penis as a murder-weapon. as he leaves 
the house, while standing between two sphinx-shaped statues 
at the woman’s front door, a bottle of milk smashes his face, 
temporarily blinding him. intermixing violence with sexuality, 
the sequence recalls Freud’s (1919) description of the beating 
fantasy as an anal regressive mode of representing an incestu-
ous genital desire. it reflects the hypothesis that the beating 
fantasy reflects a child’s interpretation of genital intercourse 
as a sadistic act or a “sex-battle” (Freud, 1908, pp. 220–221).
Finally, as staged in the film, the link between the posi-
tions of perpetrator and observer—such as taken up by the 
chief prison guard—draws attention to the social interrelation 
between authority and violence. at the start of the film, the 
complaint made by the beggar encapsulates A Clockwork Orange’s 
depiction of societal relations: “[t]here is . . . no attention paid 
to earthly law and order no more” (scene 2, emphasis added). 
yet, the film’s violence—as it is structured by the basic scenario 
“c observes: a overpowers b”—is clearly not represented in an 
un-ordered way. also, the repetitious staging of the fundamen-
tal fantasy-scenario expresses a preoccupation with, rather than 
a neglect of, legal prohibitions—a preoccupation indicated, 
paradoxically, by continuous transgression of the law. it recalls 
Freud’s description in Totem and Taboo (1913 [1912–1913]) 
of the scene of the totem meal as a structured but disguised 
staging of the primal crime against authority and thus a reaf-
firming of the two principles that underlie social law—the 
prohibitions against incest and murder (of the totem)—each of 
which correspond to “the two repressed wishes of the Oedipus 
Complex” (p. 143). From a Freudian perspective, the totem 
meal was the first scenario to express the complicity between 
the perpetrators of an act of violence—the primal crime—and 
those who observe it.
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A Scenario of Jouissance
as indicated above, a crucial function of the scenario of 
the fundamental fantasy is to reduce the complexity of social 
reality. as Žižek (2008) points out: it “[t]ells me what i am 
to my others” (p. 9). Further, it sets out the coordinates by 
which human subjects unconsciously channel bodily jouissance 
(Declercq, 2004). The literal translation of Lacan’s concept 
of jouissance as ‘enjoyment’ is inadequate. Whereas enjoyment 
connotes mere pleasure, jouissance explicitly refers to a trans-
gression of the pleasure principle (Vanheule, 2011). as Fink 
(1995) explains, it is “a pleasure that is excessive, leading to a 
sense of being overwhelmed or disgusted, yet simultaneously 
providing a source of fascination” (p. xii). similarly, McGowan 
underlines that jouissance typically manifests itself through excess. 
Lacan (1959–60/1992) relates jouissance explicitly to transgression 
of Oedipal/legal prohibitions, asking rhetorically whether “[t]o 
trample sacred laws under foot . . . itself excites some form of 
jouissance?” (p. 240). Evans (2006) points out that “enjoyment” 
as a translation lacks the connotation of sexuality. The French 
word jouissance is commonly used to refer to the experience 
of a sexual orgasm and Lacan’s conceptualization links that 
sexual dimension to a transgression of the pleasure principle.
Remarking that the beating fantasy in its final stage typi-
cally functioned as a source of masturbatory pleasure for the 
subjects that produced it, Freud (1919) clearly accentuates its 
sexual dimension but also locates it ‘on this side’ of the pleasure 
principle. still, in the theory that followed Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle (1920), the nature of the bodily experience associated 
with the fantasy altered in meaning. in “The Economic Problem 
of Masochism,” Freud (1924a) interprets the male version of 
the beating fantasy as an illustration of “feminine masochism,” 
as in many cases his patients’ imaginary identified with a per-
son of the female sex. Crucially, Freud stated that “feminine 
masochism” was rooted in the more primary bodily experience 
of “erotogenic masochism,” or “pleasure in pain” (p. 161). Re-
markably, this observation corresponds with Lacan’s emphasis 
on the paradoxical nature of jouissance, as he associates it with 
the similar experience of pleasure in pain (Evans, 2006; Lacan, 
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1959–60/1992). as such, Freud’s reference to “erotogenic 
masochism” accords in its kernel with Lacan’s (1969–70/2007) 
interpretation that the beating fantasy functions as a source of 
jouissance, dividing the subject that produces it.
Kubrick’s staging of the various positions of the scenario 
“c observes: a overpowers b” in A Clockwork Orange essentially 
revolves around its association with jouissance, illustrated most 
prominently by the ways in which the film depicts its perpe-
trators. in an interview with Michel Ciment (2001), Malcolm 
McDowell, the actor who played the part of alex, remarked 
that the direct adaptation of the HOME-sequence from the 
corresponding passage in Burgess’s 1962 novel initially did not 
work (scene 6). according to McDowell, Kubrick asked whether 
the actor could ‘dance,’ to which he responded by performing 
an impromptu dance routine while chanting the Gene Kelly 
classic Singin’ in the Rain; this routine came to serve as the basis 
for the scene’s choreography of violence. McDowell amplified: 
“alex is euphoric when he’s raping and beating, and for me, 
since Hollywood has instilled it in our brains, euphoria is Gene 
Kelly dancing in Singin’ in the Rain” (Ciment, 2001, p. 285). 
in our interpretation, the crucial factor that made the scene 
“work,” is that it revolves around a multi-layered reference to 
the experience of jouissance. That reference is first indicated 
by the paradoxical association between the pleasure-related 
choreography of the Gene Kelly song and the gang’s infliction 
of pain on their victims. second, the sequence marks the com-
bined sexual and violent dimension of jouissance, as it explicitly 
implies sexual humiliation and culminates in a rape. Third, an 
inherent dimension of excess marks the jouissance that permeates 
the scene. as McDowell points out, alex is not merely having 
fun; he is euphoric while violating the law. The multiple ele-
ments of ‘the grotesque’ composing the scene underline that 
dimension of excess: for example, the over-the-top theatricality 
of the gang member’s gestures, their insistent childish giggling, 
and the clown masks they wear as disguise.8 The deployment of 
excess is an indicator of jouissance also in McGowan’s analysis 
of Kubrick’s films. Our nuance is that, at least with regard to A 
Clockwork Orange, Kubrick’s depictions of excess are associated 
not only with the film’s figures of authority but also with the 
larger group making up the film’s perpetrators (a).
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The film also includes subtle references to jouissance in as-
sociation with the positions of the victim (B) and the observer 
(C). Early in the film, a quick-cut, close-up montage depict 
four identical ceramic Christ figures on a cupboard in alex’s 
room (scene 8) (Fig. 4). On one hand, the sequence contains 
Figure 4. series of Christ figures in alex’s bedroom (scene 8). stanley Kubrick, A 
Clockwork Orange, Hawk Films/Warner Bros.
elements that accord with a classic representation of Christ’s 
crucifixion, referring to the experience of pain in the victim: 
the figures bow their heads, wear a crown of thorns, and dis-
play nail wounds in their wrists. On the other hand, they line 
up in a dancing pose and the sequence is edited to a rousing 
passage of Beethoven’s Ninth symphony. These burlesque ele-
ments not only mark the scene as one of excess but also imply 
that the figures paradoxically derive pleasure from their suffer-
ing. similarly, during the staged humiliation of alex (scene 
23), the chief prison guard—formerly alex’s torturer, now his 
observer—responds to his humiliation with a large smile and 
enthusiastic applause (Fig. 5, left). The sequence highlights 
not only that complicity exists between perpetrator (a) and 
observer (C) but also that this complicity incarnates a sadistic 
mode of jouissance. Finally, during the film, jouissance produces 
complicity between victim (B) and observer (C). When alex is 
subjected to the Ludovico technique, he is forced to view im-
ages of violence (scenes 21–22). at the beginning of the scene, 
the character’s voice-over commentary describes those images 
as ‘beautiful,’ revealing his primary tendency to find pleasure 
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in the act of observing violence. as the result of a ‘nauseat-
ing’ serum previously injected into his body, the pleasurable 
experience is, however, soon countered by the sensation of 
intense discomfort. aversion therapy causes alex to experi-
ence a contradictory combination of pleasure and pain, or a 
masochistic mode of jouissance (Fig. 5, right). Here jouissance 
substantiates the complicity between the positions of victim (B) 
and observer (C), simultaneously taken up by alex during the 
aversion therapy.
Figure 5. Left: Facial expression of sadistic jouisssance (scene 23). Right: Facial 
expression of masochistic jouissance (scene 22). stanley Kubrick, A Clockwork Orange, 
Hawk Films/Warner Bros.
Staging the Gaze: Between Director and Spectator
in a 1968 interview with Joseph Gelmis (1970/2001), Ku-
brick comments on his preoccupation with filming the violence 
of battle scenes: “i think it’s extremely important to commu-
nicate the essence of these battles to the viewer, because they 
all have an aesthetic brilliance that doesn’t require a military 
mind to appreciate” (p. 84). although this interview princi-
pally concerned the preproduction of an unfinished biopic 
on Napoleon (Lobrutto, 2008), Kubrick’s remarks also provide 
essential insight into his staging of aggression in A Clockwork 
Orange. Kubrick’s paradoxical association of the thought of 
battle scenes with the experience of visual beauty provides a 
first indication of the fantasmatic coordinates by which his own 
jouissance is regulated. The director’s statement also suggests 
that he wanted to pass on that experience of jouissance to the 
viewer. in a subsequent comment, the director explicitly as-
239Wim Matthys
sociates a battle scene with a scenario of fantasy—indeed the 
fundamental fantasy of A Clockwork Orange: “it’s . . . like watch-
ing two golden eagles soaring through the sky from a distance; 
they may be tearing a dove to pieces, but if you are far enough 
the scene is still beautiful” (p. 84). in this scenario, a person 
(C) observes the “two golden eagles” as they attack (a) their 
victim (B), the dove. Notably, Kubrick’s statement indicates that 
an essential aspect of voyeuristic jouissance is that the spectator 
keeps a distance from the scenes of violence involved.
By contrast, in Lacan’s theory, a confrontation with “the 
gaze” implies that the spectator loses his distance towards what 
is depicted in the visual field. To illustrate the mechanism at 
work, Lacan discusses Hans Holbein’s painting of The Ambas-
sadors, which depicts two ambassadors of France, Jean de Din-
teville and Georges de selve, in stately garments, surrounded 
by objects that represent the arts and sciences of the late Re-
naissance period (Fig. 6, left). What essentially fascinates us in 
this picture, Lacan argues, is “the strange, suspended, oblique 
object in the foreground” that stains and disturbs the unity of 
the image (1963–1964, p. 88). a typical shift in the percep-
tion of the painting occurs if the spectator, upon leaving the 
room, looks back and catches an oblique view of the painting. 
at that moment the distorting element is revealed to be the 
anamorphic representation of a skull (Fig. 6, right). according 
Figure 6. Left: Hans Holbein the younger, The Ambassadors. Right: reconstruction of 
the skull represented in anamorphic perspective in the original painting.
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to Lacan, that revelation irreversibly changes the meaning of 
the other elements in the painting, which now suddenly ap-
pear to be no more than signs of vanity, marking the essential 
futility of the human condition. The spectator is confronted 
with the futility of his own existence, undermining his position 
as a ‘neutral,’ ‘objective’ contemplator of the painting (Žižek, 
1992). accordingly, for Lacan (1963–64/1994), the ultimate ef-
fect of the painting consists in the experience of being “called 
into the picture” (p. 92), of undergoing the experience that 
the painting looks back at the spectator, who is caught in the 
subjective act of seeing. The gaze, as such, does not coincide 
with the spatial position of the spectator’s eye, which is the 
reference point of geometrical optics, but is located outside in 
the visual field, as the imaginary point from which the subject 
perceives himself as being looked at. although every painting 
in some way mobilizes the gaze, it is the specific composition 
of Holbein’s painting that explicitly confronts the spectator 
with his involvement in the act of looking.
Kubrick in a similar but perhaps even more disturbing way 
aimed at confronting the spectators of his ninth feature film 
with their own implication in the cinematographic experience. 
The fact that the entire sequence of alex’s submission to the 
Ludovico technique (scene 21) is staged in a film auditorium 
logically refers to the function of the screen that separates him 
from the depictions of violence. in terms of the fundamental 
fantasy, the film’s spectator is reminded simultaneously of the 
position of distant observer (C) that he, up to that point, was 
structurally assigned towards A Clockwork Orange’s depictions 
of the scenario “a overpowers b.” in the shot that displays 
alex sitting at the bottom of the cinema auditorium, while the 
Ludovico scientists sit above him (scene 22, Fig. 3), a central 
element of its staging concerns an intense concentration of 
light, indicating the presence of the film projector at the top 
of the auditorium. Further, the position of the spectator of 
A Clockwork Orange coincides with that of the cinema screen 
that alex is forced to look at. These aspects of the scene call 
to mind Lacan’s statement that the presence of the gaze is 
typically marked by “the instrument through which light is 
embodied” and through which the spectator of a visual spec-
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tacle experiences himself as “photographed,” or turned into 
a picture himself (1963–1964, p. 106). The film scene, in our 
interpretation, reaches its ultimate effect when the spectator 
is confronted with the gaze, that is, when he undergoes the 
imaginary experience of shifting from the active position of 
distant observer to the passive position of the object looked at.
in a 1972 interview with The New York Times, Kubrick in-
dicates that it was essential to his approach toward the film’s 
spectator “to present violence . . . subjectively as alex perceives 
it” (McDougal, 2003, p. 14). as a result, the director controver-
sially invited the spectator to identify with a character that he, in 
another 1972 interview, described as “the very personification of 
evil” (strick & Houston, 1972, p. 128). according to the direc-
tor, the spectator’s tendency to reject identification with alex is 
typically countered by the latter’s positive characteristics, which 
are his total lack of hypocrisy, “his wit, his intelligence and his 
energy” (p. 128). Further, Kubrick expected that the conscious 
tendency to reject the character would also be limited by “the 
basic psychological, unconscious identification with alex . . . 
He is within all of us” (p. 129, italics added). Thus, the director 
explicitly aimed at evoking a discordant complicity between the 
film’s spectator and a character that explicitly derives jouissance 
from taking up the position of the perpetrator (a). The fact 
that Kubrick expected the film’s spectators simultaneously to 
reject and identify with alex suggests that he intended to evoke 
an experience of conflict through the viewing of depictions of 
violence—reminding us of the methods that the Ludovico sci-
entists deployed to rehabilitate alex. Through the induction 
of conflicting stimuli of (sexual) pleasure and pain, alex is 
brought to a condition of jouissance; Kinder (2001) hypothesizes 
that Kubrick aimed at a less radical but analogous experience 
with the film’s spectator. although the members of the cinema 
audience are not injected with a serum and are not strapped in 
a straightjacket, the experience of observing violence is meant 
to provoke in them the experience of conflict. That experience 
is enforced by, for example, the paradoxical association between 
the Gene Kelly song “singing in the Rain” and the sexualized 
violence in the HOME-sequence. as Rice (1972) states, “Has it 
occurred to anyone that, after having our eyes metaphorically 
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clamped open to witness the horrors that Kubrick parades 
across the screen . . . none of us will ever again be able to 
hear “singin’ in the Rain” without a vague feeling of nausea?” 
(p. 39). The film not only provokes the viewer’s complicity with 
alex qua perpetrator but also with the character’s position as 
victimized observer. in both cases that complicity is substanti-
ated by jouissance.
The Broader Picture:  
From A Clockwork Orange to the Stanford Prison Experiment
Our analysis of A Clockwork Orange highlights that the spe-
cific scenario “c observes: a overpowers b” mediates the film’s 
staging of violence, irrespective of whether that violence is 
committed by figures of authority, and that the staging of that 
scenario evokes the complicity between the spectators (C) of vio-
lence, on the one hand, and the perpetrators (a) or victims (B) 
of violation, on the other. McGowan (2007) correctly remarks 
that Kubrick’s cinema confronts spectators with the obscene 
underside that stains authority, and further, with a blind spot 
that might obfuscate their everyday perceptions of authorities. 
yet, he also adds that spectators of Kubrick’s films “see the 
absence of neutrality in authority, but not in themselves,” so 
that these films ultimately “[l]eave the spectator unscathed” (p. 
25, emphasis added). The film’s audiences, whom McGowan 
classifies as “ordinary subjects” (p. 49), have nothing to do with 
the jouissance that tarnishes the functioning of authority. This 
perspective, however, calls for the question: What effect could a 
film like A Clockwork Orange have on spectators whose everyday 
functioning involves adopting a position of authority? in our 
interpretation, spectators, rather than being left ‘unscathed,’ 
undergo the imaginary experience of losing distance from the 
screen as they are confronted with their own subjective implica-
tion in observing cinematic depictions of violence.
Finally, the parallel between Kubrick’s fantasmatic implica-
tion in making A Clockwork Orange and the position taken up by 
the scientists staged in the film moves us to extend the scope 
of our study one step further: to an investigation of the subjec-
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tive involvement of experiment leaders in “real-life” studies of 
authority as performed in the United states during the 1960s 
and 1970s. Classic examples include Milgram’s experiment on 
obedience to authority and Zimbardo’s subsequent stanford 
Prison Experiment (sPE), the latter carried out in the sum-
mer of 1971, a few months before A Clockwork Orange’s release. 
Like Milgram, Zimbardo sought scientific evidence that would 
challenge the common tendency to attribute human behavior 
to dispositional qualities. He did this by studying the influ-
ence that a situation can have on relatively ‘normal’ individuals 
(Zimbardo, 1973). in the experiment, a group of male student 
participants were randomly assigned the roles of ‘prisoners’ 
and ‘guards’ for a two-week period of observation in an ar-
tificial prison environment. The subsequent test results were 
spectacular: very quickly the ‘guards’ took it upon themselves 
systematically to humiliate the ‘prisoners,’ leading to severe 
stress-reactions in the prisoners, several drop-outs, and Zim-
bardo’s decision to bring his experiment to a premature end 
(Zimbardo, 2007). as his student participants had responded 
normally to personality tests and were randomly assigned to 
their roles, Zimbardo concluded that dispositional factors could 
be excluded as possible causes for the guard’s behavior. He 
attributed the results to the impact of the (extreme) situation 
(Zimbardo, 1973, 2007).
yet, as pointed out by De Vos’s (2010) recent analysis of 
the experiment, Zimbardo’s emphasis on the impact of the 
situation neglects his own subjective implication in the course of 
the events. The experiment leader, for example, tends to mini-
mize his involvement in the course of the events to “the evil of 
inaction—of not providing adequate oversight and surveillance 
when it was required” (Zimbardo, 2007, p. 181). De Vos, how-
ever, points out that the experiment also concerned the acting 
out of Zimbardo’s own subjective script of (a fundamental) 
fantasy, which set out the coordinates for the participants’ be-
havior from the start. The experiment, for example, included a 
“pre-briefing” of the guards, during which Zimbardo explicitly 
instructed them to deploy psychological methods of intimida-
tion and de-individuation towards the prisoners.9 
What interests us here is that Zimbardo’s scenario on 
several levels recalls the scenario involved in Kubrick’s 1971 
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film. For example, the experiment’s events largely circulated 
around a basic script of guards dominating their prisoners, a 
variation of the scenario staged in A Clockwork Orange: “a over-
powers b.” also reminiscent of the film, Zimbardo’s experiment 
explicitly meant that the staging of its scenario would revolve 
around sexual humiliation and disavowal of sexual difference. 
Whereas the guards were instructed to wear “police billy clubs,” 
or instances of the phallic symbol, his all-male prisoners had to 
wear “a smock, like a tan muslim dress,” while being “[a]llowed 
no underwear” (pp. 40–41, emphasis added). Underlining the 
implied sexual streak in his script, the experiment leader 
remarks that the roles he assigned to his all-male participants 
correspond with Oedipalized gender positions: “traditionally,” 
Zimbardo states, “Dad is guard, Mom the prisoner” (p. 216). 
Finally, throughout the majority of the experiment, Zimbardo 
took his place behind a one-way screen as both distant observer 
and cinematographer of the scenes of overpowering that he in-
augurated, a parallel with Kubrick as film director. Zimbardo’s 
self-reflective remark—that he tended to confuse his position 
of researcher with his role as the prison’s superintendent—
marks, however, a further identification: between his position 
of observer/researcher (C) and the actions elicited from his 
guards/perpetrators (a). Thus, A Clockwork Orange’s staging 
of the complicity between the positions of observer (C) and 
perpetrator (a) can be read not only as a fundamental fantasy 
but also as a cautionary tale.
Notes
1. Whereas authors at times confusingly deploy the term ‘fantasy’ to refer to the 
concept of the ‘fundamental fantasy,’ this essay will use the latter term to depict 
Lacan’s concept.
2. Lacan comments on Freud’s article in his fourth (1956–57/1994, pp. 111–129), 
fifth (1957–58/1998, pp. 233–248), sixth (1958–59, lesson of January 7, 1959), 
tenth (1962–63/2004, p. 204), fourteenth (1966–67, lessons of January 11, June 
14, and June 21, 1967), and seventeenth (1969–70/2007, pp. 65–66) seminars.
3. While the concept of the Other takes on several meanings in Lacan’s theory, in 
this context it refers to the subject’s imaginary ‘big Other,’ which can be under-
stood as the abstract beyond of the concrete other(s) (see Fink, 1995).
4. in a clinical example, Geerardyn (1994) discusses the case of a woman that en-
tered psychoanalytic treatment after having encountered sexual aggression in her 
partner. What greatly bothered her was that she had left her previous partner for 
a similar reason, prompting her to question her own implication in the course 
of the events.
245Wim Matthys
5. The references to the film’s scenes are based on the division of the film into 36 
chapters on the Warner Bros. DVD titled The Stanley Kubrick Collection, released 
in 2001.
6. sirois (2010) also highlights the way the subject appears as a spectator, specifically 
with regard to the third phase of the female version of the fantasy: “it pictures 
the subject as the detached spectator of a near-anonymous beating, whereas in 
the first version the subject is presented as a participant” (p. 515).
7. an exception can be found in the figure of the prison chaplain, whom Kubrick 
depicts as “the moral voice” of the film (Ciment, 2001, p. 149).
8. For a further exploration of Kubrick’s deployment of the ‘grotesque,’ see Nare-
more (2006). 
9. a 1989 documentary on the film includes a fragment of Zimbardo’s speech: “you 
can create in the prisoners . . . a sense of fear to some degree . . . a notion of 
arbitrariness that their life is controlled by us . . . We’re going to take away their 
individuality in various ways . . .” (Zimbardo, 1989, transcription by De Vos).
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